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By MORGAN KELLY AND CORMAC 6 GRADA*
To test a model of contagion—where individuals hear some bad news and commu-
nicate it to their acquaintances, who then pass it on, leading to a market panic—
requires a knowledge of the information networks of participants, something
hitherto unavailable. Eor two panics in the !850's this paper examines the behavior
of Irish depositors in a New York bank. As recent immigrants, their social network
was determined largely by their place of origin in Ireland, and where they lived in
New York. During both panics this social network turns out to be the prime
determinant of behavior. (JEL G21, N21)
The idea of market panics spreading through
social contagion—where individuals hear some
bad news and communicate it to their acquaintan-
ces, who pass it on in turn. leading to a market
panic—goes back at least to David Ricardo (1951
p. 68), who attributed the panic leading to the
suspension of convertibility in 1797 to "the con-
tagion of the unfounded fears of the timid part of
the community." While suggestive evidence for
the importance of networks of personal contact in
financial markets is provided by the survey data of
Robert J. Shiller {1989 Chs. 1-2), Shiller and John
Pound (1989), and Ellen Hertz's (1998) fascinat-
ing ethnographic study of investor groups in the
Shanghai stock boom of 1992. a forma! test of
market contagion requires not only information
on the transactions of individual participants, but
also a knowledge of their information networks,
something hitherto unavailable for financial
markets.'
To test the role of social contagion in market
panics, this paper looks at the behavior of de-
positors in a New York bank, the Emigrant
* Kelly: Departmeni of Economics, University of War-
wick, Coventry CV4 7AL. U.K.; 6 Grida: Department of
Economics. University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4,
ireland. We thank Patrick Honohan and two anonymous ref-
erees for their detailed and constnictive criticisms of earlier
versions of the paper; and Marion Casey and Tyler Anbinder
for guidance on the New York Irish. Any erTors are ours.
' In sociology, the classic study of Bryce Ryan and Neal C.
Gross (1943) showed the central role played by influence of
neighbors in the diffusion of hybrid seed com. Josef L^on-
ishok et ai. (1992) and Mark Grinblatt et al, (1995) examine
whether instituiional investors herd together in buying or sell-
ing the same stock, but find limited evidence for this.
Industrial Savings Bank, during two bank runs
in the l850's. We can reconstruct the social
networks of these depositors with some confi-
dence because of one fact about them: most
were recent immigrants from Ireland.
The classic pattern of migration is that newly
arrived immigrants move in near people they
knew in their home country." As a recent immi-
grant, one's social network in the new world is
determined in large part by where one came from
in the old. We confirm that social networks reflect
place of origin by using marriage records from a
church located close to the bank. Of Irish couples
married there in the 185O's. a majority had come
from the same county, and very often the same
parish, in Ireland; and frequently inhabited the
same tenement in New York. Consequently, if a
depositor had emigrated from County Cork in
Ireland, we can be quite confident that he knew
other depositors from Cork.
After taking account of the individual char-
acteristics of depositors and their account
histories, we test how well social-network vari-
ables—county of origin and district of resi-
dence—distinguish depositors who closed their
accounts during each panic from those who
stayed with the bank. We use a classification-
tree procedure that recursively partitions the set
of depositors into increasingly homogeneous
groups of panickers and stayers.
The results obtained are striking. While factors
such as length of time the account had been open.
^Robert Emst (1994 pp. 40-41); George J. Borjas
(1995); Thomas Sowell (1996 pp. 4-9).
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years lived in the United States, and size of ac-
count have some role in predicting behavior, the
most important characteristic that distinguishes
panickers from stayers is county of origin in Ire-
land. Depositors from one set of counties tended
to close their accounts in both panics, while oth-
erwise identical individuals from other counties
tended to stay with the bank. County of origin also
determines, in the more important run, the timing
of panicking: different groups of depositors closed
their accounts at different times. The importance
of county of origin in determining behavior does
not diminish the longer the depositor had lived in
America, reflecting the well-known failure of
these, mostly very poor, immigrants to assimilate
into wider New York society.
Bank panics are the product of observable
events that are perceived by depositors to con-
tain adverse information about a bank's sol-
vency. They can be the result of a sequence of
stochastic withdrawals (Douglas Diamond and
Philip Dybvig, 1983). or of asymmetric infor-
mation between the bank and its depositors
about the quality of the bank's assets (V. V.
Chari and Ravi Jagannathan. 1988).'' What mat-
ters is that a few depositors decide for some
reason that the bank is in trouble and start to
pass the news on to their acquaintances.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section I
gives the historical background to the paper,
discussing the bank, Irish immigrants in New
York, and the panics of 1854 and 1857. Our
data are summarized in Section II, and Section
III tests the importance of social networks rel-
ative to individual characteristics in distinguish-
ing depositors who panicked from those who
stayed put. Section IV concludes.
1. Historical Background
A. Bank
The Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank
(EISB) was one of a score of mutual savings
•' A useful survey of the causes of panics is given by
Charles W. Calomiris and Gary Gorton (1991). Our concern
here is with contagion among depositors, rather than the
contagion among lenders considered by Guillermo Calvo
and Enrique Mendoza (1995), Jeffrey Sachs et al. (1995),
and others. The role of bank solvency in propagating panics
is examined by Calomiri.s and Joseph R. Mason (1997).
banks set up in New York Stale before the Civil
War. These banks, established to offer high
interest and liquidity to the industrious poor,
proved extremely popular: in New York City by
1860 there wa.s one savings bank account for
every four people (Alan L. Olmstead, 1976 p.
4). For good economic histories of the early
savings banks, see Peter L. Payne and Lance E.
Davis (1956) on Baltimore, and Olmstead
(1976) on New York City.
The EISB was set up on Chambers Street in
the Sixth Ward by a group of prominent Irish
citizens, acting at the behest of the ubiquitous
Bishop John Hughes of New York, in Septem-
ber 1850. Its first depositors were overwhelm-
ingly Irish immigrants and, although it attracted
increasing numbers of German immigrants and
Irish-Americans, this group still held almost 90
percent of accounts in the late 185O's. By 1860
it had over 10,000 accounts and held over $2
million on deposit, making it a medium-sized
savings bank by contemporary standards (Olm-
stead, 1976 p. 159).
What makes this bank notable is the large
amount of background information on individ-
ual depositors that it collected, which makes its
archive a primary source of information about
Irish immigrants to America in the immediate
post-Famine period.* For example, the bank's
first depositor, Bridget White, was the wife of a
tailor living on Henry Street in the Seventh
Ward. Bom near Mountmellick in Queens
County, Ireland, she had arrived in New York
nine years earlier on the Eairfield out of Liver-
pool. Her father still lived in Ireland, but her
mother was dead. She had four brothers (whose
names are given), three of them living in the
United States, and three sisters.
The patterns of account holding in the bank are
discussed in 6 Grada and Eugene White (1999)
and summarized below in Table 3. While some
account holders behaved in true Smilesian fash-
ion, making small deposits and allowing them to
accumulate, and others made frequent deposits
and withdrawals, treating their accounts almost as
checking accounts; in most cases, as George Alter
et al. (1994) found for the Philadelphia Saving
" Our data are taken from Reels 4-5 and 15-20 of the
microfilms of the EISB archives in the New York Public
Library.un THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2000
Fund Society in 1850, accounts were relatively
large in size, brief in duration, and inactive.
B. People
The EISB was located in the greatest concen-
tration of Irish immigrants in North America.
New York was the main port of entry into the
United States for Irish immigrants and, by the
mid-1850's, contained almost as many Irish-
bom people as Dublin. Like immigrants every-
where, the Irish tended to cluster in
neighborhoods of their own. In New York in
1855, Irish immigrants accounted for 28.2 per-
cent of the city's population but made up over
two-fifths of the populations of the First,
Foutih, and Sixth Wards. Immigrants from dif-
ferent parts of Ireland tended to cluster in dis-
tinct enclaves; Monroe Street was known as
"Cork Row," in the Fourth Ward the area next
to the East River was "a favorable spot for
Kerry men and their descendants," and so on
(John T. Ridge, 1996 pp. 276-77). The EISB
was located in the Sixth Ward next to streets
teeming with impoverished immigrants from
Counties Kerry and Sligo.
Marriage patterns reflect social networks, and
the importance of regional and local networks
for Irish immigrants is demonstrated by the
marriage records of a Roman Catholic Church
located a few hundred yards from the EISB, the
Church of the Transfiguration of Our Lord.^ As
Table I shows, in the period 1853 to 1860, most
Irish couples who married there had come from
the same or neighboring county in Ireland.
Among men originating from the well-
represented counties of Kerry and Sligo, more
than two-thirds married women from the same
county and, in most cases, from the same corner
of the same county. Ten of the 15 grooms from
Tuosist parish in Kerry married women from
the same parish, and three more women from
neighboring parishes. Eleven of the 29 grooms
from the parish of Rahamlish in Sligo married
women from Rahamlish, and another four mar-
ried women from a neighboring parish.
Certain Sixth Ward addresses recur in the mar-
riage records. For instance, thirteen men, mostly
' These records are discussed in more detail in 0 Grada
(1999 pp. 114-21).
TABLE 1- -MARRIAGE PATTERN.S OF IRISH IMMIGRANTS,
1853-1860
Birthplace of spouses of Irish-bom
persons married in Church of the
Ttansfiguration of Our Lord
Percentage
Same county
Neighboring county
Same province
Elsewhere in Ireland
Outside Ireland
Women
49.4
18.0
3.9
21.9
6.8
Men
51.1
18.6
4.0
22.6
3.6
Notes: Based on all marriages of occupants of Ihe area
bounded by Canal, Baxier. Peari. and Chatham/Bowery for
the period October 1853-November 1860. Sample includes
722 women and 698 men. Thanks to Heather Griggs who
supplied the database.
with different surnames and mostly from County
Cork, married out of 22 Mulberry Street in the
185O's. The residence at 31 Baxter Street supplied
eight grooms, all from Kerry or neighboring west
Cork, and five of them maixied women giving the
same address. Given that in about one marriage in
four both bride and grtxjm gave an address in the
same tenement demonstrates how narrowly cir-
cumscribed by place of origin in Ireland and res-
idence in New York were the social networks of
Irish immigrants.
C. The Panics of 1854 and J857
Our purpose is to examine how these immi-
grants behaved during two bank panics: a small
run in 1854, and the major Panic of 1857. The
1854 run began on December 12 with the news
that, for the second week running, the Knicker-
bocker Bank (parent of the Knickerbocker Sav-
ings Bank, the only New York savings bank to
fail in the antebellum era) had not produced a
weekly statement for the New York bankers'
clearinghouse (Olmstead, 1976 pp. 142-43).
On December 13 several savings banks were
forced to pay out freely, and on the following
day the Bank of Savings on Chambers Street
sent $200,000 of its government paper to Wash-
ington for redemption. The news reduced the
demand for deposits but, although the city's
press was unanimous in denouncing the gull-
ibility of those involved in the run and repeat-
edly urged that the city's other savings banks
were sound, banks continued to experience high
rates of account closure until December 30.VOL 90 NO. 5 KELLY AND 6 GRADA: MARKET CONTAGION 1113
During this period, well over 200 savers in the
EISB closed their accounts.
The Panic of 1857 started in New York with
news of the failure of the Ohio Life and Trust
Company (August 24) and of the loss of a
steamer en route to New York with $2 million
of uninsured gold bullion (September 17). The
crisis quickly spread from the United States to
the Utiited Kingdom, where it provoked the
suspension of the Banking Act of 1844, and
thence to the Continent (Charles Kindleberger,
1978 p. 186). The Panic of 1857 led to a brief
but sharp rise in unemployment in New York
(Edwin G. Burrows and Michael Wallace, 1999
pp. 845-46) and had a devastating short-term
impact on banking systems and stock exchanges:
for a recent interpretation of the panic see Calo-
miris and Larry Schweikart (1991).
New York's savings Institutions were far
more seriously affected in 1857 than they had
been in 1854. Although the press and the finan-
cial establishment were dismissive of the fears
of the crowds who gathered around banks, the
declines in railway stock and state and munici-
pal bonds were such as to threaten the solvency
of at least some of the banks (6 Grada and
White, 1999). For several days thousands of
account holders lined up to withdraw most or all
of their savings. On October 13 the savings
banks invoked a rarely imposed clause in their
articles of agreement limiting withdrawals on
demand to 10 percent of the outstanding bal-
ance, and brought the panic to a close. Between
September 28 and October 13, 1857 over 500
EISB savers closed their accounts, nearly two-
fifths of them on October 12 and 13 alone.
II. Data and Estimation
We consider the behavior of depositors dur-
ing the panics of 1854 and 1857. Based on our
earlier discussion, we date the 1854 panic as the
period December 11 to December 30, and the
1857 panic as the period September 28 to Oc-
tober 13. These two events show clearly as
spikes in the monthly series of changes in the
number of EISB accounts (closures minus
openings) in Figure I. A depositor is defined as
a panicker if he closed his account during these
periods. A possible limitation of this detinition
is that it excludes depositors who removed most
of their money while keeping their account
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS
(NET CLOSURES) BY MONTH, 1851-1860
open. However, given the frequency with which
depositors closed accounts, and the low time
cost of reopening an account, this is probably
not important. The relatively short duration of
both panics reduces the force of a second limi-
tation, that our "panickers" include some depos-
itors who would have closed their accounts in
any case.
For each period, our sample consists of all
panickers and a one in ten sample of other
depositors who decided not to close their ac-
counts. This led to an initial sample of 598
accounts for 1854, of which 235 were closed
during the panic; and 1,035 accounts, including
505 panickers, for 1857. Note that only a small
proportion of depositors (6 percent in 1854 and
8.7 percent in 1857) closed their accounts on
each occasion.^
For each depositor we recorded the date the
account was opened, the number of deposits and
withdrawals made prior to the panic, and the
closing balance of the account (or its balance at
the end of the panic, if the account stayed open).
As well as this account information, we col-
lected information about the personal details of
•"The sample size was dictated by ihe need to calculate
individual-iiccounl details from handwrilten bank ledgers.
Varying ihe proportion of nonpanicker:! sampled changes
the reported sample probabilities of panicking bui does not
affeci the relative significance of explanatory variables.1H4 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2000
FIGURE 2. MAP OF I850'S NEW YORK, SHOWING PHELPS'S GRID ASSIGNMENTS
Source: Based on City of New York, published by Thomas Cowerthwait & Co. (Philadelphia, 1850).
depositors: their sex, occupation, how long they
had been living in the United States, atid, most
importantly, their social networks.
As the marriage data discussed above dem-
onstrated, the social networks of Irish immi-
grants reflected two interrelated facts about their
lives: where they had come from in Ireland, and
where they lived in New York. We have data on
both factors: we know the province and county
of origin of most Irish depositors, and the street
addresses of all depositors.
To convert street addresses into district codes
we use the street grid of Humphrey Phelps's
"New York City Street and Avenue Guide" in
Phelps (1857) (see Figure 2). This assigned the
city into grids about 1,000 yards square (approx-
imately 11 north-south blocks by 4 east-west
blocks).^ Streets in row F below 14th Street are
grouped together as Downtown, the area between
14th Street and 32nd Street we label Midtown,
and the remainder of Manhattan as Uptown. Our
' Some longer streets span more than one grid square but
are assigned by Phelps to one, so some depositors on these
streets will have been assigned to the wrong square.VOL 90 NO. 5 KELLY AND 6 GRADA: MARKET CONTAGION 1115
TABLE 2—DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
Panicked
Previous deposits
Previous withdrawals
Closing balance
Length open
Years in United States
Occupation
Sex
District
County
Account closed during panic
Number of deposits made into account at annualized rate, excluding initial deposit
Number of withdrawals from account prior to panic
Closing balance if panicked, balance at end of panic otherwise
Number of months the account had been open prior to panic
Number of years the depositor had lived in the United States
Occupation: laborer (1), professional (p). or other (o)
Female or male
Depositor's address given by grid coordinate of Phelps's 1857 "New York City Street and
Avenue Guide" (3b-6d); otherwise Downtown (dt). Midtown (mt). Uptown (at). Long
Island (ti). Brooklyn (bn), Slalen Island (si). New Jersey (nj). Upstate (us), or oiher (oth)
Depositor's county of origin in Ireland
Note: Panic is defined as the period from December 11 to December 30 for the 1854 data, and from September 28 to October
13 for the 1857 data.
TABLE 3—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR STAYERS AND PANICKERS. 1854 AND 1857
Previou.s deposits
Previous withdrawals
Closing balance
Length open
Years in United States
Female
Laborer
Professional
Ulster
Connacht
Munster
Stayers
Z18
1.33
186.86
16.05
7.98
31.71
44.72
4.07
33.74
9.76
29.67
1854
Panickers
2.61
3.08
124.36
11.56
5.42
31.61
59.59
1.55
16.06
17.62
36.79
Stayers
2.01
1.1
223.36
23.84
10.61
32.97
42.78
3.81
28.33
13.90
27.52
1857
Panickers
2.19
1.45
161.5
18.34
8.02
43.36
52.38
3.25
14.2«
15.04
40.35
Note: Entries for numerical variables are means; entries for factors are percentages of
accounts.
Other districts are Brooklyn, Long Island, Staten
Island, New Jersey, Upstate, and other. As well as
capturing potential neighborhood effects, this grid
allows us to gauge the impact of shoe-leather costs
on panicking: depositors living in squares closer to
the bank face a lower cost of going to the bank and
closing their accounts and may therefore be more
likely to panic.^
Restricting ourselves to Irish depositors whose
county of origin is known, and whose address we
could locate, gave us a sample of 439 accounts,
including 193 panickers, for 1854: and 766 ac-
counts, including 399 panickers. for 1857. The
variables that we use to distinguish between pan-
ickers and stayers are defined in Table 2, and
summary statistics are presented in Table 3.
There are several notable features about the
We are grateful to a referee for this point.
depositors summarized in Table 3. The first is
the high proportion of unskilled workers—
laborers, porters, domestic servants—among
depositors, composing about half of all ac-
counts; with most ofthe remainder belonging to
clerks and small capitalists. Secondly, most de-
positors were recent immigrants: over 80 per-
cent had arrived since the start of the Great
Famine in 1845. Thirdly, at a time when the
average weekly wage of a male laborer was
around $5, with a female domestic earning
about half that, the average account balance was
large: $160 in 1854 and $190 in 1857. with
medians of SI00 and $ 115 respectively. Finally,
accounts were short lived—the average account
had been open for 14 months in 1854 and 21
months in 1857—and comparatively inactive
when open, averaging three or four transactions
a year.
Comparing panickers with stayers, the major1116
Intercept
Previous deposits
Previous withdrawals
Closing balance
Length open
Years in United States
Female
Laborer
Professional
Ulster
Connacht
Munster
Density
Null deviance
Residual deviance
Percent misclassified
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
TABLE 4—CHARACTERISTICS OF PANICKERS:
1854
0.4976
(0.2758)
0.0139
(0.021)
0.0225
(0.0173)
-0.0018*
(0.0008)
-0.0324**
(0.0102)
-0.0456*
(0.0201)
-0.II7I
(0.2273)
0.452*
(0.2133)
-0.4297
(0.7098)
0.0648
602
553
35
1857
0.5951**
(0.2178)
0.0059
(0.0261)
0.043
(0.0303)
-0.001*
(0.0005)
-0.0116**
(0.0044)
-0.0459**
(0.0126)
0.3581*
(0.1618)
0.2565
(0.1572)
0.299
(0.4267)
0.0882
1061
1001
39
LOGISTIC REGRESSION
!854
0.5747
(0.3314)
0.0062
(0.0208)
0.0281
(0.0182)
-0.001*
(0.0008)
-0.034**
(0.0105)
-0.04*
(0.0202)
-0.1263
(0.2319)
0.4945*
(0.2182)
-0.2398
(0.7138)
-0.8247**
(0.2951)
0.4871
(0.338)
-0.0295
(0.2617)
0.0641
602
537
32
DECEMBER 2000
1857
0.6118*
(0.2543)
-0.0037
(0.0264)
0.0389
(0.0306)
-0.0008
(0.0005)
-0.0117**
(0.0045)
-0.0396**
(0.0128)
0.3627*
(0.1635)
0.2124
(0.1591)
0.3737
(0.4303)
-0.6116**
(0.219)
0.025
(0.2405)
0.2065
(0.1916)
0.0882
1061
987
36
Note."!: Logistic regression. Dependent variable: Panicked. Standard errors are in parentheses. 439 observations for 1854. 766
for 1857. Density is the mean of the logistic density estimated for each observation, adjusted for the undersampling of stayers:
multiplying the coefficient of a numerical variables by this gives the marginal effect of the variahle on the probability of
panicking. Null deviance and residual deviance are minus twice the log-likelihood (up to a constant) when only the intercept
is included, and when all explanatory variables are included respectively. Percent misclassified is the percentage ot
observations where the predicied value of the dependent variable differs from the actual value.
* Denotes pseudo-l-statistic significant at 5 percent.
** Denotes pseudo-(-statistic significant at I percent.
differences are in size of deposit and length of
time in America: the larger one's account and
the longer one had lived in the United States the
less likely one was to panic. Province of origin
also mattered, with depositors from Ulster un-
derrepresented among panickers relative to
other provinces.
This informal division is supported by logis-
tic regressions for the probability of panicking
reported in Table 4. The regression coefficients
reflect the behavior of the sample where pan-
ickers are overrepresented. Up is the fraction of
our sample that panicked, then p/(\0 — 9p) is
the fraction of the bank's depositors that pan-
icked. To estimate the marginal effect of a nu-
merical variable on the true probability of
panicking for an individual at the mean level of
the covariates, these coefficients are multiplied
by the figure in the row labeled "Density,"
which is the logistic multiplier times the deriv-
ative ofthe population probability of panicking.
The undersampling of stayers implies that this
adjustment factor is substantial, in the range
0.06 to 0.08.
In both 1854 and 1857 the probability of
panicking declines the longer one had lived in
the United States and had been with the bank,
the larger one's account balance, and if one
came from Ulster. Holding other covariates
fixed at their mean values, and again adjusting
for the fact that only one in ten stayers were
sampled, a depositor from Ulster has a predictedVOL. 90 NO. 5 KELLY AND 6 GRADA: MARKET CONTAGION 1117
TABLE 5—ACCOUNTS AND PANICKER.S BY COUNTY
Counly of
origin
Antrim
Armagh
Carlow
Cavan
Clare
Cork
Derry
Donegal
Down
Dublin
Fermanagh
Galway
Kerry
Kildiire
Kilkenny
Laois
Leitrim
Limerick
Longford
Louth
Mayo
Meath
Monaghan
Offal y
Rascommon
Sligo
Tipperary
Tyrone
Wateribrd
Westmeath
Wexford
Wicklow
Total
Accounts
10
!3
5
31
9
49
6
16
9
21
4
24
28
8
13
6
7
34
12
5
8
11
11
6
12
7
24
12
8
16
7
5
439
1854
Panickers
(percent)
20
40
0
29
33
45
0
12
67
43
25
71
50
38
62
50
43
56
42
100
75
45
t8
50
50
29
54
25
50
44
57
20
44
Accounts
8
13
9
39
22
84
n 23
8
36
12
35
73
a
29
18
13
51
21
15
15
24
22
14
29
19
32
24
14
22
16
3
766
1857
Panickers
(percent)
50
31
56
26
59
57
67
17
50
56
58
57
74
9
45
78
54
51
38
53
67
67
32
50
55
37
62
38
43
55
0
52
probability of panicking of 3 percent in 1854
and 5 percent in 1857, only half that of a de-
positor from Leinster (the omitted province in
the regression dummies), whose predicted prob-
abilities are 8 percent and 10 percent respec-
tively. In addition, depositor's occupation is
significant for 1854, while sex is significant for
1857.
The importance of networks of personal ac-
quaintance in propagating panics can be seen in
the day to day accounts of the bank. During the
1854 run, for instance, we find that John Hayes
and John Lane {originally from Cork) and
Thomas Murray and Michael Corcoran (from
Roscommon). all laborers living at 26 Cherry
Street, showed up at the bank on September 14
and closed their accounts.
Table 5 shows that there is a large variation in
the likelihood of panicking across different
counties of origin. In 1857, for example, while
52 percent of accounts in our sample closed
during the panic, only 17 percent of depositors
originally from Donegal and 26 percent from
Cavan (both Ulster counties) panicked, com-
pared with 67 percent for Meath and 74 percent
for Kerry. The hypothesis that these proportions
are equal across counties is strongly rejected:
the chi-squared statistic is 52.4 for 1854 and
74.6 for 1857, both significant at I percent. It
can be seen that the same counties tended to
produce panickers or stayers in both years: the
rank-order correlation between percentage of
panickers in both years is 0.55.
Figure 3 maps the likelihood of panicking by1118 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2000
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FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF DEPOSITORS AND PERCE^^rAGE OF PANICKERS BY COUNTY OF ORIGIN
IN IRELAND. 1854 AND 1857
Note: Dark lines are boundaries of provinces.
county of origin in Ireland. Neglecting counties
with few depositors, it shows not only a strong
variation in the probability of panicking, but
also that the counties least likely to produce
panickers are clustered in the north and north-
west of the county.
When county-of-origin dummies were added
to the regressions in the first two columns of
Table 4, only Galway and Wexford in 1854
were individually significant. However, the
county dummies are jointly strongly significant:
the chi-squared statistic for the hypothesis that
their coefficients are jointly zero is 54 for 1854
and 72 for 1857. Using district-of-residence
instead of county-of-origin dummies, districts
4d and 4e were individually significant in 1854,
and district 4b in 1857. Testing joint signifi-
cance of all districts gave a borderline signifi-
cant chi-squared statistic of 30 for 1854, but a
highly significant 43 for 1857. If county of
origin is already included, the district-of-
residence dummies are jointly insignificant for
1854, but significant at 2 percent for 1857.
While these results suggest that social network
factors may play an important role in panics, we
need a technique that can handle factors with
many levels, and possible nonlinear interactions
between explanatory variables, more economi-
cally than a logistic regression.
III. Social Networks in Panics
To examine the importance of social net-
works in propagating panics, an elegant and
intuitive approach is provided by the classifica-
tion-tree procedure of L. Breiman et al. (1984).^
Classification trees use a recursive, binary par-
titioning procedure to split the data into groups
of observations that are as homogeneous as
possible in terms of the dependent variable.
The procedure goes through all explanatory
variables and tries a split at each level for every
numerical variable, and for every combination of
levels for each factor. It chooses the split that
partitions the data into panickers and stayers with
as few misclassifications of individuals as possi-
ble. For instance, an account balance of $60 might
provide the best split, with depositors holding less
than this tending to panic and those with more
tending to stay. The procedure is then repeated for
* A good introduction to classification trees is given by
W. N. Venables and B. D. Ripley (1994 Ch. 13).VOL 90 NO. 5 KELLY AND 6 GRADA: MARKET CONTAGION 1119
each of the two new subgroups of data, with the
algorithm again searching through the explanatory
variables to find the best partition in each case. For
example, among depositors with a balance of less
than $60, district of residence niight give the best
split, with depositors from districts 4c and 4d
tending to panic and those from other districts
tending to stay; while for depositors with balances
above $60, length of time in the United States
might give the best partition, with those present
more than five years being inclined to stay and a
majority of those present less than five years pan-
icking. This partitioning process continues until
the process runs out of observations.
Splits higher in the tree are more important in
terms of distinguishing panickers from stayers
than splits lower down. The result is a decision
tree that gives a rule for classifying each indi-
vidual, and states the probability that an indi-
vidual is misclassified by this rule. A typical
decision path might be, for example, that an
individual with less than $60 in the bank, who
lived in districts 4c or 4d, and was an unskilled
workers is predicted to he a panicker; and of the
12 individuals in the sample that fit this descrip-
tion, 4 are incorrectly classified as panickers.
The 32 levels of the county factor lead to over
two billion possible splits that must be evaluated,
making the algorithm impossibly slow. We there-
fore omitted depositors from the four counties
with the fewest accounts in each year. This al-
lowed the algorithm used to run in a reasonable
time, and reduced the chance of results being
distorted by a factor level corresponding to a
handful of observations. This gave 420 observa-
tions for 1854 and 738 for 1857.
The results of the classification procedure for
1854 and 1857, estimated using the S-Plus pack-
age, are presented in Figures 4 and 5. The inter-
pretation of these figures is straightforward. The
value at each node, I or 0, tells whether the
majority of depositors at that node were panickers
{1) or stayers (0). The number alb below the node
gives the number of misclassified observations a
as a fraction of the total number of observations at
the node b. Looking at the left-most path of Figure
4, for instance, we can see that of 102 depositors
who came from AnUim, Cavan, Clare, Derry,
Donegal, Monaghan, Sligo, and Tyrone, only 23
panicked; and of the 7 depositors from these coun-
ties who had been with the bank for less than 2.1
months, all but one panicked.
The pattern of results in Figures 4 and 5 is
immediate and striking. For both panics, the most
important factor that distinguishes panickers from
stayers is county of origin. In both 1854 and 1857,
depositors from Cavan, Donegal, Monaghan, Ty-
rone, and Sligo tended to stay while depositors
from other counties tended to panic. Among de-
positors from staying counties, three-quarters
stayed with the bank in 1854, and two-thirds in
1857- For these depositors, the length of time with
the bank (1854) and the size of their balance
{1857) have a secondary effect in reducing the risk
of panicking.
Among depositors from other counties,
slightly over half those in the sample panicked
in 1854 and 60 percent in 1857. In both years,
the most important secondary characteristic of
panickers is length of time in the United States:
of 23 depositors in 1854 who had been there
more than 18 years, only 3 panicked; while in
1857 more than two-thirds of depositors who
had lived less than 8 years in the United States
panicked. After this, the most important char-
acteristic is district of residence for 1854. with
depositors from the contiguous blocks 4c, 4d,
4e, and 5d likely to panic (these blocks lie close
to the bank, which is located in 4c, suggesting a
possible role for shoe-leather costs, although
this effect is probably mitigated by the small
size of the city at the time); and in 1857 it is
number of months with the bank.
These results are highly robust; using any
large subset of the data in each year gave rise to
the same pattern of partitions.'" The most
important assurance of robustness is the simi-
larity of the trees generated in each year.
The parsimony of the classification tree is
apparent. Using only the first two layers of the
tree, 63 percent of depositors are correctly clas-
sified in 1854, and 65 percent in 1857, and this
'" A referee raised the possibility that the large number
of levels of the county factor could generate a spurious
importance for that variable. If depositors are assigned a
county al random, county does appear occasionally as high
as the second or third split variable in a tree. In ihis case,
however, the generated trees were nonrobust: using differ-
ent subsets of each year's data generated different patterns
of splits by county, and the county partitions were very
different for each year. That a large number of levels need
not generate classiticatory power is shown by ihe district of
residence variable, with 23 levels, which does not appear
high in any tree, even when the county variable is omitted.1120 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2000
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FIGURE 4. CLASSTHCATION TREE, 1854 PANtc
Note: The number in each node denotes whether the majority of depositors there are panickers (1) or stayers (0); the fraction
beneath the node detiotes the proportion of depositors that are misclassified at the node.
rises to 67 and 68 percent respectively if the
next layer of the tree is added. This is similar to
the misclassification rates obtained from the
logits in Table 4.
Classification trees continue to partition data
until they run out of observations, resulting
in overfitting. To prune the fitted tree, two ap-
proaches are available. The first is to split the dataVOL. 90 NO. 5 KELLY AND 6 GRADA: MARKET CONTAGION 1121
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FIGURE 5. CLAssincATioN TREE, 1857 PANIC
Note: The number in each node denotes whelher the majority of depasitors there are panickers 11) or stayers (0); the fraction
beneath the node denotes the proportion of depositors that are misclassifled at Ihe node.
into a training sample, which generates a tree
whose classificatory power is then measured on a
separate testing sample. Adding extra node.s ini-
tially reduces misciassification rate in the second
sample until, as overfitted naies are added, the
misciassification rate starts to rise. Alternatively a
cross-validation procedure (Breiman et al., 1984
pp. 59-81) can be used where subsets of obser-
vations are used in tum to fit the tree, which is
then tested on the remaining observations. Both1122 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2000
1 0
0 1 1 0
FIGURE 6. SCHEMATIC VERSION OF CLASSIFICATION TREES IN FIGURES 4 (1854, LEFT)
AND 5 (1857, RIGHT)
Note: The depth of the branches below each node indicates the relative importance of each
split in reducing the misclassification rate.
approaches were tried here and, based on misclas-
sification rates, suggested the trees with approxi-
mately 16 terminal nodes that are reported here.
These trees have a misclassification rate of 22
percent tor 1854 and 25 percent for 1857.
While the relative importance of each split is
indicated by its position in the classification
tree, it is not evident from Figures 4 and 5 how
much each split contributes to the reduction of
the misclassification rate. This is shown in Fig-
ure 6 where the amount by which each split
improves the fit of the tree is proportionate to
the length of the branches beneath it. While
county of origin is the most important split for
both trees. Figure 6 shows that county has much
greater classificatory power for the major panic
of 1857 compared with the smaller run in 1854.
Given that county of origin is the most impor-
tant determinant of panicking, does it follow that
social networks are influencing individual behav-
ior, or is county of origin merely proxying for
some omitted individual characteristic such as ed-
ucation or previous experience with banks? While
individual education is likely to be captured by the
occupation and bank-balance variables, region of
origin may determine the economic sophistication
of recent immigrants. In terms of economic devel-
opment, regions of nineteenth-century Ireland can
be ranked Eastern Ulster, Leinster, Munster, and
Connacht and Western Ulster. While the impor-
tance of the Ulster variable in tbe logistic regres-
sions in Table 4 might suggest that economic
sophistication of Ulster depositors is what deters
them from panicking, looking at Table 5 and the
classification trees we can see that most Ulster
depositors came from poorer western counties
rather than the industrialized east. In particular,
few depositors from very poor northwestern coun-
ties, such as Sligo and Donegal, panicked; while
depositors who had come from more prosperous
eastern counties, such as Dublin, Meath, and
Wexford, showed a strong tendency to panic.
Few of the EISB"s depositors are likely to have
had previous contact with banks in Ireland, where
joint-stock commercial banking relied almo.st ex-
clusively on a professional and business clientele.
While Ireland did have a trustee savings-bank
movement dating from 1815, its scale was tiny:
only 90,000 depositors out of a population of
about 8.5 million on the eve of the Great Famine
(1845-1850), compared with nearly 70,000
depositors in New York City alone in 1850
(Olmstead, 1976 pp. 157-61; 6 Grada, 1994
pp. 138-42). Irish savings banks catered to a
disproportionately urban clientele, and the over-
whelmingly rural background of Irish emigrantsVOL 90 NO. 5 KELLY AND O GRADA: MARKf-T CONTAGION 1123
means that few of those who opened accounts in
New York can have previously held accounts in
an Irish savings bank. The possibility that some
EISB depositors from Dublin and Kerry were
acting on recollections of the well-publicized
frauds that affected savings banks in Dublin,
Tralee, and Killamey in 1848 cannot be ruled
out, although arguably such memories would
have deterred them from opening an account in
thefirstplace(R.D.C. Black, 1960 pp. 152-53;
6 Grada, 1999 pp. 54, 155-56).
Do social networks affect the timing of pan-
icking? Each of the panics here spanned tbree
weeks. In 1854, 60 percent of panickers left in
the first week, 26 percent in the second, and 14
percent in the third week (forgoing a half year's
interest payment of 3 percent); while in 1857.
24 percent left in the first week, 37 percent in
the second, and 39 percent on the first two days
of the third week, before withdrawals were re-
stricted. Using a classification tree to determine
wbat week tbe account was closed, for 1854.
district of residence was tbe most important
determinant of timing, but has a high error rate.
For 1857 bowever, tbere is a clear difference in
timing of closure by county of origin: panickers
in the first week tended to be from Clare, Derry,
Donegal, Tipperary. and Westmeath: wbereas
panickers in the tbird week tended to be from
Fermanagh. Kerry. Longford. Meath. and Sligo.
It might be expected that the effect of county
of origin on bebavior would diminish the longer
the depositor had lived in America and formed
otber ties. To test this we split depositors by
years lived in tbe United States (trying splits at
five and eight years) to see if depositors who
bad been tbere longer behaved differently from
new arrivals. However, for both 1854 and 1857.
the two groups behaved tbe same, with county
of origin being the prime determinant of pan-
icking. This failure to assimilate reflects tbe
social isolation of these immigrants: in general.
wealthier Irish immigrants left New York rap-
idly for cities with greater economic opportuni-
ties; tbose remaining were the poorest and least
skilled (Joseph P. Ferrie, 1999 pp. 47-50).
IV. Conclusion
To test whether social contagion helps to
propagate panics in Hnancial markets we need
to identify the informational networks of market
participants. In this paper we were able to do
tbis by looking at a distinctive group of depos-
itors: Irish immigrants living in New York in
the t850's. As immigrants, tbeir social net-
works reflected two interrelated facts about their
lives: where tbey bad come from in Ireland and
where they lived in New York.
When we examined the behavior of these
depositors in the panics of 1854 and 1857. we
found tbat whether an individual panicked or
not depended strongly on bow long they bad
lived in America, and how long tbey had been
with the bank. The most important factor in
whether they panicked, however, was county of
origin. Depositors from one set of counties
tended to close their accounts in both panics,
while otherwise identical individuals from other
counties tended to stay witb tbe bank. Our re-
sults show that individual behavior depends not
only on private information but on access to the
information and opinions of other group mem-
bers, and raises the possibility tbat a handful of
influential individuals can have a lot of power
over group opinion.
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